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a b s t r a c t
Allocating water to different uses implies trading off the benefits perceived by different
sectors. This paper demonstrates how visualising the trade-offs implied by the best per-
forming water management options helps balance water use benefits and find sustainable
solutions. The approach consists of linking a water resources model that can simulate many
management policies and track diverse measures of system performance, to a many-
objective evolutionary optimisation algorithm. This generates the set of Pareto-optimal
management alternatives for several simultaneous objectives. The relative performance of
these efficient management alternatives is then visualised as trade-off curves or surfaces
using visual analytic plots. Visually assessing trade-offs between benefits helps select
policies that achieve a decision-maker-selected balance between different metrics of
system performance. We apply this approach to a multi-reservoir water resource system
in Brazil’s semi-arid Jaguaribe basin where current water allocation procedures favour
sectors with greater political power and technical knowledge. The case study identifies
promising reservoir operating policies by exploring trade-offs between economic, ecological
and livelihood benefits as well as traditional hydropower generation, irrigation and water
supply. Results show optimised policies can increase allocations to downstream uses while
increasing median land availability for the poorest farmers by 25%.
# 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Water resources management has been described as a
‘wicked’ class of planning problem (Liebman, 1976; Lund,
2012; Reed and Kasprzyk, 2009) with difficult to predict ‘‘waves
of repercussions’’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) resulting from the
complex interactions between social, environmental and§ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the C
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the orig
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: a.hurford@hrwallingford.com (A.P. Hurford), i.h
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1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2013 The Authors. Published by Els
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2013.10.003economic impacts. The need to consider multiple concurrent
and sometimes conflicting objectives is a salient feature of
water resource management (Reed et al., 2013). Visually
displaying trade-offs between these objectives can play a
useful role in solving wicked problems because it helps
stakeholders assess how non-commensurate goals relate.
In reservoir systems, livelihood factors such as ecological
and social impacts are often considered after monetisablereative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
inal author and source are credited.
uskova@ucl.ac.uk (I. Huskova),
evier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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(GWP, 2003; McCully, 2001). Political conflict can result where
poor or marginalised groups are not involved in decision-
making processes, jeopardising the sustainability of benefits
(McCully, 2001; Nguyen-Khoa and Smith, 2004; WCD, 2000).
Methods which combine scientific and local knowledge to
consider the inherently complex impacts of any policy show
promise for more sustainable management of environmental
resources (Bryant, 1998).
Stakeholder participation in managing reservoirs can
mitigate conflict and ensure wider societal knowledge and
objectives are considered (Johnsson and Kemper, 2005; Poff
et al., 2003; Roncoli et al., 2009; Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000).
Some participatory approaches overlook the trade-offs inher-
ent in water management decisions, however (Kallis et al.,
2006). Explicitly considering trade-offs between many objec-
tives can help avoid negative impacts of human decision
biases in complex planning problems (Brill et al., 1982). Many-
objective problems are those considering 4 or more objectives
(Reed et al., 2013). Considering fewer objectives can lead to
‘‘cognitive myopia’’ (Hogarth, 1981), where the diversity of
possible solutions is unrealistically constrained, or lead to
‘‘cognitive hysteresis’’ (Gettys and Fisher, 1979), where
preconceptions about the nature of a problem are reinforced
by lack of new insight. Kollat et al. (2011) show that increasing
the number of objectives considered can change decision
makers’ preferences about system performance.
Trade-off curves or surfaces representing Pareto-optimal
relationships between conflicting management objectives are
a recognised tool of water management (Loucks et al., 2005).
Their form elucidates the degree of sacrifice of one benefit
required for gain of other benefits. Pareto-optimal solutions
are those which cannot be improved for any one of the benefits
considered, without disadvantaging one or more of the others.
Trade-offs were illustrated numerically (Haimes and Hall,
1974) or with simple visualisations (Loucks, 2006; Ryu et al.,
2009) until the advent of advanced visual analytic tools (Keim
et al., 2008) allowed multiple dimensions (objectives) and
richer information to be explored in a more intuitive way.
These tools have recently been applied to the results of many-
objective water resources planning and management optimi-
sations (Kasprzyk et al., 2009; Kollat and Reed, 2006; Matrosov
et al., Subject to minor revisions; Reed and Kollat, 2012).
A large body of literature considers the optimisation of
reservoir planning and operation. Linear programming, non-
linear programming, dynamic programming and their var-
iants are classical methods of single or multiple objective
optimisation, though they require pre-assigned (a priori)
weights or procedures to combine objectives (Cohon, 1978;
Yeh, 1985). With these methods the water system model must
be embedded in the mathematical programme which typically
requires simplifying assumptions to represent the non-linear
features common in water resources systems. The challenges
of identifying Pareto-optimal trade-offs with complex forms or
more than 2 objectives using classical multi-objective meth-
ods (Shukla et al., 2005) has limited their application to real-
world problems (Bhaskar et al., 2000). Shukla et al. (2005)
contrasted these classical methods with a multi-objective
evolutionary algorithm (MOEA) continuing to perform well as
trade-off complexity and number of objectives increased.Multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) (Coello
et al., 2007) are heuristic search techniques which perform
thousands of simulations to ‘evolve’ the best policies for the
given objectives. As the algorithm can be separated from the
simulation model, trusted existing simulators can be used in
the optimisation. Optimisation using MOEAs is attractive
because preferences about performance objectives need not
be expressed a priori through weightings. This is significant
because the desirability of any given level of benefit depends to
some extent on the sacrifice required to achieve it; this cannot
be known a priori. Preference decisions are made after trade-
offs are revealed, representing an a posteriori approach (Coello
et al., 2007). MOEA optimisation has been under development
for two decades and can now consider up to 10 objectives in
some cases. Reed et al. (2013) review the state-of-the-art.
MOEAs have been used to optimise reservoir rules
(continuous storage-release relationships) (Shiau, 2009) and
reservoir operating rule curves (target storage levels through-
out the year) (Chang et al., 2005). Ecological and economic
objectives have been optimised simultaneously using MOEAs
(Suen and Eheart, 2006). This paper contributes an MOEA
trade-off analysis for multi-reservoir system operation and
water allocation considering novel livelihood-related objec-
tives alongside traditional economic objectives (irrigation,
hydropower, and water supply). Trade-offs between benefits
are explored using visual analytics and impacts of optimised
reservoir operating policies are examined for a three-reservoir
system in NE Brazil’s Jaguaribe basin.
The next section describes the case study, followed by a
methods description in Section 3. Results are described in
Section 4 with discussion and conclusions following in
Sections 5 and 6.
2. Jaguaribe basin case study
The state of Ceara´ in north east Brazil is semi-arid with
annual average rainfall between 400 (interior) and 1200 mm
(coast). Ceara´’s largest city Fortaleza is expanding with a
water transfer from the nearby Jaguaribe basin to meet its
growing needs. At 610 km the Jaguaribe river is the world’s
longest naturally dry river which although now perennia-
lised, historically ran dry for up to 18 months during severe
droughts; at worst killing thousands of people (Taddei, 2005).
Flow variations are extreme and evaporative losses are
significant. The basin’s three largest reservoirs are Castanha˜o
(6700 Mm3), Oro´s (1940 Mm3) and Banabuiu´ (1601 Mm3),
totalling over 75% of the basin’s storage capacity (Fig. 1).
Reservoir operation is a critical issue as a large population of
rural poor depend on surface water for their livelihoods
(reservoir dependent fisheries and agriculture).
A biannual participatory negotiation of reservoir releases,
based on current storage, occurs for the three reservoirs
individually. Its effectiveness in empowering vulnerable
groups is still questioned (Broad et al., 2007; Johnsson and
Kemper, 2005; Taddei, 2011) as poorer stakeholders such as
farmers and fishermen are often under-represented or
marginalised in the negotiation and relatively ineffective
compared to the politically powerful and technically knowl-
edgeable (Taddei, 2005). Results of the water utility’s
Fig. 1 – Five Jaguaribe sub-basins overlaid with a schematic of the major water resources system (inset: location in Brazil):
three large reservoirs and four major perennialised river reaches (coloured). Large font represents four modelled supply
regions (map from Mendiondo, pers. comm.).
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number of release scenarios form the basis of negotiation and
eventually consensus about the subsequent season’s
releases. The primary conflict in negotiations is between
users who benefit from water retention (high storage levels)
and those who benefit from regular releases. Current policy
dictates that 30 months of municipal supply must be
guaranteed from the date of negotiation (Sankarasubrama-
nian et al., 2009).
3. Methodology
We formulate the water management problem of the Jaguaribe
basin by representing it with a water resource management
simulator. Decision variables within the simulator represent
management policies and objective functions measure the
performance of different policies. The model is linked to an
optimisation algorithm which explores the performance ‘space’
by varying the decision variable values, revealing approximate-
ly Pareto-optimal trade-offs. In other words, the simulator
tracks several performance metrics throughout the river basin
which allow the optimisation algorithm to search for solutions
where the only way to further improve one objective causes loss
of performance in other objectives. Rather than resulting in a
single optimal solution, this method provides trade-off curves
or surfaces which show which decisions lead to the best
balanced system performances.
3.1. Water resource system simulation
The open-source IRAS-2010 water resources management
simulator (Matrosov et al., 2011) is used to simulate the
Jaguaribe basin. IRAS-2010 was selected due to its appropriate
level of complexity and adaptability and its computationalefficiency. Model run times can be kept to the order of seconds;
in our study this meant 25,000 model runs executed by the
optimisation algorithm took 1.5 h using a 16 processor cluster.
The sections below describe how the model is parameterised
and how system performance is measured.
3.1.1. Jaguaribe basin model
The river network model comprises 119 reservoir and
abstraction nodes connected by 174 river, abstraction and
return flow links. Initial reservoir storages are set at mean
January levels over the 2002–2010 period. The upstream
boundary condition is a 90-year historical (1911–2000) inflow
time-series for each reservoir. The downstream boundary is
an unrestricted outflow node – not accounting for tidal
influence. A monthly (30-day) time step is used so flow
entering a river reach passes through it within a time-step,
removing the need for flow routing.
Transmission losses are estimated as 0.6% of discharge per
km (Reˆgo, 2001). Return flows are based on information
provided by de Arau´ jo (Personal communication) based on
measurements in a Middle Jaguaribe river (Reˆgo, 2001).
Evaporation is accounted for using monthly mean daily
evaporation rates applied to each reservoir.
3.1.2. Demands
A water demand prioritisation feature of IRAS-2010 is used to
ensure the model allocates water realistically when availabili-
ty is limited. As water flows down the river the model ensures
water is allocated according to user-defined priorities. The
priority of demand sectors is municipal, livestock, industry,
irrigation then aquaculture. Aggregated monthly demand data
from abstraction license data, account for both fixed and
varying demands in each sector.
Transfer to Fortaleza is prioritised equally with Municipal
demands in the Castanha˜o and Lower Jaguaribe supply areas,
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not prioritised owing to its low capacity and hydraulic gradient
which make it ineffective as a transfer to Fortaleza. Demand
volumes by supply region and sector are provided in Hurford
et al. (2012).
3.2. Performance metrics
This section describes the sixteen metrics used to quantify
system performance under different management policies. It
was not possible to engage stakeholders in metric development
at this stage. Some of these metrics are used as optimisation
objective functions (Section 3.3.2). Each time the simulator is
executed to evaluate an operating policy, scores produced for
each metric used as an objective function allow the optimisa-
tion algorithm to search for the best policies.
System water ‘losses’ are calculated as the sum of mean
annual evaporative loss from all three reservoirs plus
uncontrolled releases (also a surrogate for flood protection)
from the Castanha˜o and Banabuiu´ reservoirs. Uncontrolled
releases from Oro´s reservoir are captured by Castanha˜o
reservoir and therefore not lost to the system.
Hydropower deficit is calculated as the mean annual
number of months when the hydropower generation potential
at Castanha˜o reservoir falls below 100% of capacity.
In months when storage in all three reservoirs is below 25%
of their maximum capacity, it is considered that there are no
good fisheries for poor itinerant fishermen (based on AZCOL
classification in Hardy (1995)). Fisheries deficit is defined as the
mean annual number of months with poor fisheries in all three
reservoirs.
Land availability for farmers of the reservoir floodplain
(Vazanteiros) is represented by the mean annual proportion of
the maximum land available when the growing season begins
(based on van Oel et al. (2008)). It is summed across all three
reservoirs. Land availability depends on low enough reservoir
levels so that fertile land is exposed, but high enough levels
that this land can be irrigated by pumping from the reservoir.
The optimum is at 2/3 of reservoir capacity, meaning retention
benefits the poorest farmers.
Agricultural deficit is assessed for the four supply regions
separately to enable considering the trade-offs between them.
Owing to the prioritisation of allocations, aquaculture demand
allocation will be reduced to zero before agriculture loses any
of its allocation. The metric is calculated as the mean annual
volumetric deficit from the 90% level of supply reliability
(supply/demand). An aggregated metric – the sum of regional
deficits – is also calculated to allow higher level (more
aggregated) trade-offs to be explored.
There is concern that the altered flow regime at the mouth of
the Jaguaribe river negatively impacts estuarine ecosystems
and by implication ecosystem services. Mangrove intrusion on
agricultural land and declines in economically important crab
and fish populations are of particular note (Marins and Lacerda,
2007). Following Connell’s (1979) intermediate disturbance
hypothesis (IDH) we assume that the river flow variability
represented by the unregulated (naturalised) flow frequency
curve is most likely to support healthy native ecosystems.
Accounting for Gao et al.’s (2009) eco-surplus and eco-deficit
approach, we use a flow alteration metric which assesses thedeviation of the regulated flow from the unregulated flow
frequency curve. Flow alteration is assessed seasonally to
correspond with the temporal resolution of reservoir release
rules.
Two flow alteration metrics are computed (one for each
season – wet/dry) as the negative sum of Nash–Sutcliffe
efficiencies (Nash and Sutcliffe, 1970) for ten corresponding
deciles of the regulated and unregulated curves, at the outlet of
the basin (the location of concern for Marins and Lacerda, 2007).
The negative sum is used to make the metric more intuitive – it
is desirable to minimise flow alteration, rather than maximise
it. Deciles are used to avoid favouring any particular range (e.g.
high flows) at the expense of others. The range of the metric is
10 to infinity, although physical limits mean the value is
unlikely to approach infinity. Perfectly matching curves give
10. An aggregated metric – the sum of seasonal alterations – is
calculated to allow higher level trade-offs to be explored.
The simulation model registers the minimum volume of
municipal reserves reached during each 90-year simulation
and converts this to an equivalent duration of municipal
supply, accounting also for evaporation. This quantifies the
security of municipal supply provided by any management
policy because a drought can theoretically begin at any
moment – impacts are likely to be greater, the lower the
reserves at that time. This index helps evaluate the con-
sequences of relaxing the current policy guaranteeing 30
months of municipal supply. This metric is calculated for each
reservoir; Lower Jaguaribe municipal demand being divided
between Castanha˜o and Banabuiu´ proportional to storage
capacity. An aggregated metric – the sum across all reservoirs –
is calculated to allow higher level trade-offs to be explored.
3.3. Optimisation model formulation
The search for the best management policies and performance
trade-offs is facilitated by connecting the water management
simulator to a multi-objective search (optimisation) algo-
rithm. The IRAS-2010 simulator is linked via a C++ wrapper to
the Epsilon Dominance Non-dominated Sorted Genetic Algo-
rithm-II (e-NSGAII) (Kollat and Reed, 2006; Reed et al., 2013).
The optimisation formulation is described in Appendix A,
Section 3.3.1 describes the decision variables used to represent
different management policies and Section 3.3.2 describes the
objective functions used to assess performance of each policy.
3.3.1. Decision variables
The decision variables optimised are release (hedging) rules
for the individual reservoirs, together representing a manage-
ment policy. To limit the complexity of the optimisation
problem, and considering the current biannual negotiation
process, we chose to separate wet season (January–June) and
dry season (July–December) rules per reservoir. The release
rules can be visualised as piece-wise linear curves leading to
21 decision variables (Fig. 2).
3.3.2. Objective functions
Ten of the sixteen performance metrics (Section 3.2) are used
as objective functions (i.e., to direct the optimisation algo-
rithm’s search for the best management policies). The other
six metrics provide additional information when visualising
Fig. 2 – Seasonal release rule (hedging) curves as represented by the IRAS-2010 Jaguaribe model. Each patterned pair of opposing
arrows represents an optimisation decision variable. Point D is the dead storage of the reservoir. Point A is the storage level at
which releases are restricted to municipal supply. B points can be varied in two dimensions for hedging. C points represent the
controlled release when the reservoir is full. In total 7 decision variables define each reservoir’s release rule.
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specified to provide meaningful differentiation between
management policy outcomes. There would be little gained
from comparing 0.1 months of difference in hydropower
deficit, for example. Metrics, goals and results precision are
listed in Table 1; objective function equations are detailed in
Appendix A.
3.3.3. Optimisation verification and parameters
Evolutionary optimisation algorithms begin with a random
draw of decision variable values. To ensure the optimisation
worked well, a random seed (RS) analysis can be undertaken to
check that different start points finish with the same optima.
We carried out a 50 RS analysis which confirmed results from
the single seed analysis (original optimisation) satisfactorily
represent the whole trade-off surface.
Optimisation parameters for the e-NSGAII followed Kaspr-
zyk et al. (2009).
3.3.4. Visual analytics
We use visual analytics (Keim et al., 2008) to interactively
explore the trade-offs between competing objectives, and addTable 1 – Performance metrics and their objective functions, g
Performance metric Objective function (App
Evaporative/spill losses flosses
Hydropower deficit fhydro
Fisheries deficit ffish
Land availability fland
Agricultural deficit – Oro´s fOro´sagr
Agricultural deficit – Castanha˜o fCastanha˜oagr
Agricultural deficit – Banabuiu´ fBanabuiu´agr
Agricultural deficit – lower Jaguaribe fLower Jaguaribeagr
Flow alteration – wet season fwetflow
Flow alteration – dry season fdryflowanalytical and non-optimised information to the trade-off
surface to highlight information about the results. Visual
analytics provide a holistic picture of the multiple measures of
performance and the policies which led to them. It allows large
datasets (1000’s of points) to be analysed in a time-efficient
and visually appealing manner facilitating more informed
decision-making (Kollat and Reed, 2007; Lotov, 2007). The
visual analytic plots crafted below aim to help make a posteriori
decisions about the preferred balance of benefits considering
the various trade-offs (Coello et al., 2007). Any selected point
from the trade-off surface represents the performance
achieved for all metrics by a specific set of reservoir control
rules (policy).
4. Results
4.1. Pareto-optimal trade-offs
A Pareto-optimal trade-off (Cohon, 1978) occurs where no
further performance gains can be achieved in any one
objective, without reducing performance in one or more ofoals and results precision.
endix A) Goal Result units and precision
Minimise 50 Mm3
Minimise 1 month
Minimise 1 month
Maximise 0.02
Minimise 0.05 Mm3
Minimise 0.1 Mm3
Minimise 0.1 Mm3
Minimise 0.025 Mm3
Minimise 2.5
Minimise 2.5
Fig. 3 – Solid (non-dominated) solution points show the
Pareto-optimal trade-off between land availability and
aggregated agricultural deficit. Dominated solution points
are greyed out. Arrows show the direction of improved
performance (optimisation). Each point represents the
performance achieved when simulating one release rule
policy for the three reservoirs.
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solution points between two axes. The trade-off curve
represents the ‘non-dominated set’ of solutions, meaning
that other (dominated) solutions are available but all are
outperformed by one or more of the non-dominated results.
Fig. 3 illustrates these concepts using two example solutions
within a trade-off curve: solution A performs better for
agriculture deficit, while B performs better for land availability
(both are Pareto-optimal). Land availability and agricultural
deficit represent conflicting objectives therefore a decision (a
‘trade-off’) must be made about how much to sacrifice
performance in one to improve performance in the other. In
our case each solution on the trade-off curve represents the
set of release rules (management policy) for the reservoirsFig. 4 – Trade-off curve from Fig. 3 expanded into a trade-off su
axis). Both panels show the same surface; two angles are used
increases, so the number of points comprising the trade-off sur
supplementary data (online version) helps illustrate the shape which achieves the respective benefits. Evolutionary algo-
rithms are heuristic search methods that approximate the
Pareto surface without ever reaching it in an absolute
mathematical sense. Formally therefore, the trade-offs are
‘Pareto-approximate’ although we refer to them subsequently
as ‘Pareto-optimal’ to simplify the discussion.
4.2. Retention-release
The first trade-off we investigate is between retention
(storage) and release (Fig. 3): the key conflict of reservoir
management in the Jaguaribe basin. A balance must be struck
between the two and this balance has implications for all
stakeholders. In Fig. 3 and all subsequent figures, the
aggregate agricultural deficit metric (benefiting from release)
is used to show high-level trade-offs, except where aggrega-
tion is addressed in Section 4.7. Land availability (benefiting
from retention, see Section 3.2) also represents fisheries deficit
as the two metrics are correlated (not conflicting). Dominated
solutions are not shown in subsequent figures to simplify
illustration of trade-offs.
4.3. Flow regime alteration
The storage of water to allow perennially flowing rivers even
during the dry season interrupts natural flow regimes (see
Section 3.2). Fig. 4 shows the same trade-off as Fig. 3 but with a
third axis showing the flow alteration metric. In three
dimensions, rather than a trade-off curve we now have a
trade-off surface which allows visualising how performance
across all three metrics is distributed for the best reservoir
management policies. Fig. 4 shows as land availability
increases (benefit), flow alteration increases (disbenefit). The
lowest agricultural deficits (benefit) are in the mid-range of
flow alteration benefits. At high flow alteration (poor ecologi-
cal performance), decreasing flow alteration initially improves
agricultural deficits but at around 500 further ecological
improvement causes loss of agricultural benefits.
It is worth recalling from Section 3.2 that the flow alteration
metric represents not only purely ecological interests, but also
impacts on the ecosystem services of the Jaguaribe estuary.rface by also considering the flow alteration metric (vertical
 to aid orientation. As the number of axes (dimensions)
face increases. The animation available in Appendix B
of this trade-off surface.
Fig. 5 – Progressive addition of information to the trade-off surface from Fig. 4. The x- and y-axis are labelled only in the
bottom panel (d) for simplicity but apply to all panels. Initially a fourth optimisation dimension is added to show
hydropower performance (a), then visual effects are used to illustrate further features of the solutions, (b) the minimum
total municipal reserves reached, (c) the region of the trade-off surface where each metric performs best, and (d) gradation
of regret to emphasise where best performing compromises are likely to be. The animation available in Appendix B
supplementary data (online version) helps illustrate the shape of the trade-off surface in 5(c).
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therefore imply trade-offs between the support of upstream
and downstream livelihoods.
4.4. Expanding the trade-off surface
In Fig. 5(a) the optimised hydropower deficit metric is
displayed (using cone orientation, where up is high deficit
and down is no deficit) on the same trade-off surface displayed
in Fig. 4. Two viewing angles (left and right panels) are
displayed to enhance visualisation. This is consistent with
maximising hydropower production by balancing high reser-
voir storage (hydraulic head) with releases to drive turbines.
Fig. 5(b) shows the municipal reserves using cone size, where
large cones indicate large reserves and small cones small
reserves. Municipal reserves increase with land availability
and flow alteration, i.e., retention rather than release. Fig. 5(c)
uses colours to highlight which metric performs best for each
solution. Regions of high performance for different metrics
become apparent in the objective space. In Fig. 5(d) transpar-
ency is used to highlight the solutions likely to constitute high
performing compromises, using regret analysis (Savage, 1954).
Low regret solutions are opaque while high regret solutions
are transparent.
Regret (R) quantifies how much a policy’s (s) performance
(P) deviates from the performance of the best-performing
policy (s0) in each performance metric (c), for the same set of
input parameters (inflow time series) (j) and is normalised by
the range between the best and worst-performing (s00) policies
(Eq. (1)). The best performing result has a Regret of 0 and the
worst performing a Regret of 1.
Rcðs; jÞ ¼ Pcðs
0; jÞ  Pcðs; jÞj j
Pcðs0; jÞ  Pcðs00; jÞj j (1)
4.5. Investigating details of selected Pareto-optimal
operating rule sets
Five points representing specific interesting management
policies were selected from the trade-off surface of Fig. 5 to
demonstrate their reservoir storage, release rule and flow
regime implications. The best performing policy was selectedFig. 6 – The trade-off surface from Fig. 5(d) with coloured boxes
span the whole trade-off surface so they help to understand thfor each metric plus one example ‘compromise’ policy. The
location of each point is highlighted on the trade-off surface in
Fig. 6.
4.6. Reservoir storage levels
Fig. 7 shows how the 5 selected reservoir operating rule sets
impact monthly reservoir storage levels (as percentage of full
capacity). Retention and river regulation is minimised in
Fig. 7(a) to preserve the unregulated flow regime. Conversely,
Fig. 7(e) shows storage maximised around the best level for
land availability, which also means fisheries deficit is low.
Fig. 7(d) illustrates a known (Lund and Guzman, 1999) policy
for reservoirs in series supporting hydropower generation –
Oro´s storage is sacrificed to maintain hydraulic head for
generation at Castanha˜o. Fig. 7(b) and (c) represents balances
between release and retention to increase dependability of
supply; in (b) to minimise agricultural deficit and in (c) to
balance all the objectives.
4.7. Aggregated metrics
The agricultural deficit and flow alteration metrics used to
define the trade-off surface in Figs. 4 and 5 were aggregated.
Visual analytics allow us to examine the trade-off within these
aggregations and consider the balance between the compo-
nent metrics. Should a particular region of the sub-trade-off
curve/surface be preferred, this can inform constraining the
surface in Fig. 6 during a decision-making process. Fig. 8 for
example, shows the selected rule set locations within the
context of the disaggregated agricultural deficit trade-off. This
shows how much less than optimal performance must be
accepted in these metrics in order to achieve high perfor-
mance in other metrics or the example compromise rule set.
4.8. Release rules
As described in Section 4.1, the solutions comprise a set of
reservoir release rules of the form shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 9
illustrates the five selected rule sets (policies) in the same
form. The rule curves demonstrate the conflict between Pro-
poor and Eco-flow policies as curve shapes are almost mirror highlighting the location of selected policies. The policies
e implications as release rules change across the surface.
Fig. 7 – Average reservoir storage profiles over the 90-year simulation period for selected release rule sets; (a) Eco-flow, (b)
Min-deficit, (c) Compromise, (d) Max-hydro, and (e) Pro-poor. The range of storage generated by each rule set is indicated by
10th, 50th and 90th percentile plots; colour tones and line thickness differentiate between reservoirs.
Fig. 8 – Trade-off between regional agricultural deficits. Coloured boxes highlight the location of selected policies. This
shows how less than optimal agricultural deficits in some regions must be accepted in order to achieve high performance
(green, red, blue) or the example compromise rule set (grey). (For interpretation of the references to color in this legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
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Fig. 9 – Seasonal release rule sets for each reservoir (NB: x-axis changes according to reservoir storage capacity).
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flow favours release. These points also lie at opposite ends of
the trade-off surface (Fig. 6). Other policies balance or mimic
the two extremes, to varying degrees, seasonally to achieve
their respective high or balanced performance.
4.9. Flow alteration
Examining flow frequency curves (Fig. 10) resulting from
each selected release rule set helps understand flow
alteration metric optimisation. Fig. 10 shows how different
regions of the unregulated curve are affected by particular
release rule sets. These plots help decide how far regulated
flows should be allowed to stray from unregulated (natural)
flows. The gap between regulated and unregulated curves inthe wet season (Fig. 10(a)) represents the volume stored – it is
not possible to achieve natural flow conditions and at the
same time store water. Regulated flows are closer to the
natural regime in the dry season (Fig. 10(b)) as the flows are
an order of magnitude lower than in the wet season. Less
water needs to be released  to meet these flows, with less
impact on storage.
Further data pertaining to the requirements for maintain-
ing perennial flows would allow constraining the optimisation
within particular limits.
4.10. Comparing optimised to current operation
Comparison of optimised solutions with observed reservoir
releases is limited by the fact that the reservoirs were built at
Fig. 10 – Unregulated (natural) basin outlet flow frequency
curve compared to results of selected release rule sets.
Flow frequency curves provide the probability that a given
flow will not be exceeded. Flow is zero where lines do not
contact the y-axis.
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when all reservoirs are active and have accomplished their fill-
up period. Inflow data were not available to us for modellingFig. 11 – Reservoir storages for (a) the optimised compromise rel
2004 observed Oro´s and Banabuiu´ reservoirs pre-Castanha˜o co
storages. Storages (b) and (c) show the impact of the Castanha˜o
in management than those represented in (a).this period, so it is not possible to account for the hydrological
validity of the comparisons made here. Nevertheless Fig. 11
shows marked differences between reservoir storages implied
by the example optimised release rule set and observed
storages resulting from both recent negotiated releases and
those before the construction of the Castanha˜o reservoir.
Comparison of observed dry season release data for 1998–
2010 (Oro´s and Banabuiu´ ) and 2002–2010 (Castanha˜o), with dry
season releases resulting from the optimised Compromise
release rule set shows the Castanha˜o releases are similar
although greater for the optimised rules, but substantial
differences are apparent between releases for the other two
reservoirs – release rates varying more widely with the
optimised rules. The same example optimised rules increase
median land availability performance over that calculated
from observed reservoir levels by 25%.
5. Discussion
The rich information revealed by visual analytic plots of
Pareto-optimal solutions allows stakeholders to understand
environmental management conflicts in an intuitive way.
Considering many benefits in a single visualisation helps
maintain a broad perspective in comparing policies. It is more
difficult to ignore the benefits available to poor and margin-
alised groups when they are explicitly represented alongside
traditional measures of economic performance. We hypothe-
sise that this type of information lends itself well to group
decision-making such as that currently used in the Jaguaribe
basin and could supplement current analysis outputs consid-
ered during reservoir release negotiation.
We have shown how performance varies across the Pareto-
optimal surfaces for different objectives. We considered the
details of high level trade-offs with aggregated metrics and
showed for example the implications for reservoir levels and
seasonal flow regimes (Figs. 7 and 10). Once a decision is made
about the balance between benefits, the approach quickly can
provide information about the policy (release rule set in our
case) required to achieve the selected balance.ease rule set simulated using 1911–2000 flows, (b) the 1968–
nstruction, and (c) and observed 2004–2011 reservoir
 reservoir construction and also suggest different priorities
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 3 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 7 2 – 8 6 83It is important when optimising to carefully consider the
spatial and temporal resolution of objective functions. This
can help avoid compensation effects whereby one region or
time period has high benefits to ‘‘subsidise’’ low benefits in
other regions or time periods. This may or may not be
acceptable in real management decisions and is the reason for
using seasonal flow alteration and regional agricultural deficit
metrics. Even so, we see compensation effects in the example
Compromise policy; agricultural deficit in the Oros region is
allowed to be high at times to keep Oros reservoir water levels
high to enhance fisheries and land availability there. In this
case the disaggregated trade-off (Fig. 8) can be used to help
apportion deficits between the four regions.
Current releases appear from Fig. 11 and additional
analysis to be more conservative than the example optimised
releases generated by us, favouring storage over release.
Available release data (COGERH, 2011) suggest that releases
are often lower than those agreed to during negotiations. The
reasons for this are unclear, but regional water manager risk-
aversion could be a factor. It is also possible that the 7-year
period is insufficient to compare optimised and current
management owing to lack of sufficient hydrological variabil-
ity in that period. Land availability increases suggest opti-
mised rules can simultaneously increase benefits dependent
on both storage and release.
Demonstrating the advantages of Pareto-optimal solutions
may be difficult in developing country contexts where data are
scarce against which to either calibrate and verify models or to
compare benefits. We hypothesise that stakeholders who trust
the environmental system simulator and who develop their
own benefit functions in shared vision modelling approaches
are more likely to support the balanced solutions output by our
approach. The case study described here is deterministic; an
explicitly stochastic analysis may be more appropriate for
management where climate change impacts are relevant over
the time-scale considered in the decisions.
6. Conclusions
We have applied a multi-criteria framework for optimising the
management of a shared resource system explicitly consider-
ing the benefits of multiple groups including livelihood
objectives. The framework links a water management
simulator to a many-objective optimisation algorithm. Be-
cause the system simulator outputs several performance
metrics the end result is not a single prescriptive ‘optimal
solution’ but rather a diverse set of (approximately) Pareto-
optimal reservoir operation policies where each solution is
‘best’ given a unique set of preferences. No ‘weights’ or
‘priorities’ must be elicited a priori from users of this approach;
the approach is an a posteriori one which results in Pareto-
optimal trade-off curves or surfaces which encapsulate the
trade-offs implicit in the best performing decisions. Water
managers can assess policies and their impacts without
having to decide and declare how much they value the
different metrics of performance. This is important in
environmental management because the desirability of any
given level of benefit depends to some extent on the sacrifice
required to achieve it; this cannot be known a priori.The generated trade-off curves or surfaces are comprised of
individual Pareto-optimal points which represent the mod-
elled performance of one operating policy (in our case study:
wet and dry season rules for each of the 3 reservoirs). The
trade-offs are displayed using visual analytic tools that allow
interactive exploration of solutions by stakeholders.
This approach was applied to a reservoir management
problem in NE Brazil. In that system 3 reservoirs are managed
to support local municipal demand, agriculture, aquaculture
and industry as well as an inter-basin transfer to a growing
metropolis. Groups of poor farmers and fishermen are
marginalised in the current negotiated release process. Using
plots of reservoir storage levels and flow frequency we
illustrated the real world effects of different optimised
reservoir release rule policies. We hypothesized that benefits
to marginalised social groups are less likely to be neglected if
they are plotted in trade-off curves alongside traditional
measures such as irrigated agricultural and hydropower
production. Many-objective optimisation supported by ad-
vanced visualisation can help diverse groups of stakeholders
select consensual policies for complex shared environmental
resource systems.
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Appendix A
This appendix details the mathematical optimisation
formulation and objective functions used for optimisation,
as described in Section 3.3.2 and Table 1.
A.1. Optimisation formulation
FðxÞ ¼ ð f losses; fhydro; f fish; f land; f Jagr; f SflowÞ
8 x 2 V
x ¼ ðXsi Þ
(A.1)
where j is a supply region and j; 2 Oro´s; Castanha˜o;
Banabuiu´; Lower Jaguaribeg, s is a season and s 2 wetf
season; dry seasong, i is a reservoir and i 2 Oro´s, Castanha˜o,
Banabuiu´ .
XSi represents a reservoir i’s release rule during season s.
The decision variables being optimised are individual
reservoir release rules, where XSi represents reservoir i’s
release rule during season s for each of the 3 large regional
reservoirs.
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Minimise f losses ¼
1
Y
XY
y¼1
X
j
S pill jy þ
X
i
Eva piy
0
@
1
A
i 2 Oro´s; Castanha˜o; Banabui u´f g
j 2 Castanha˜o; Banabui u´f g
(A.2)
where y is the year in the time horizon, Y is the total number of
simulated years, i and j are reservoirs, Eva piy represents the
evaporative losses from reservoir i in year y, and S pill jy repre-
sents spills from reservoir j during year y.
A.3. Hydropower deficit objective
Minimize fhydro ¼
1
Y
XY
y¼1
HDMy (A.3)
where HDMy is the number of months in year y when there is
the hydropower deficit.
A.4. Fisheries deficit objective
Minimize f fish ¼
1
Y
XY
y¼1
FUMy (A.4)
where FUMy is the number of months in year y when the
fisheries underperform.
A.5. Land availability objective
Minimize f land ¼
1
Y
XY
y¼1
X
i
ALiy (A.5)
where ALiy is the available land in the floodplain of reservoir i in
year y.
A.6. Agricultural deficit objective
Minimize f jagr ¼ 1Y
XY
y¼1
ADjy (A.6)
where ADjy is the deficit in supply region j in year y. An
additional aggregated metric – the sum of regional agricultural
deficits at each timestep – is not itself optimised, but is used for
analysis unless explicitly stated otherwise.
A.7. Flow alteration objective
Minimized f sflow ¼ 
X
d
1 
PTD
t¼1 ðFFCut  FFCrtÞ2PTD
t¼1 ðFFCut  FFC
u
dÞ
2
0
@
1
A
s
d
d ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10f g
(A.7)
where d is a decile of the flow frequency curve, t is a timestep,
TD is the total number of timesteps within decile d; FFCutrepresents the unregulated flow frequency curve value for
timestep t; FFCrt represents the regulated flow frequency curve
value for timestep t and FFC
u
d is the mean value of unregulated
flow frequency curve in d. s represents a season, i.e. the flow
alteration is calculated separately for each season. An addi-
tional aggregated metric – the sum of seasonal flow alterations
– is not itself optimised, but is used for analysis unless explic-
itly stated otherwise.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.envsci.2013.10.003. Supplementary data consist of 3D anima-
tions of Figure 4 and Figure 5c to provide a clearer
understanding of the trade-offs across the surface.
r e f e r e n c e s
Bhaskar, V., Gupta, S.K., Ray, A.K., 2000. Applications of
multiobjective optimization in chemical engineering.
Reviews in Chemical Engineering 16, 1–54.
Brill, E.D., Chang, S.Y., Hopkins, L.D., 1982. Modeling to generate
alternatives – the HSJ approach and an illustration using a
problem in land-use planning. Management Science 28,
221–235.
Broad, K., Pfaff, A., Taddei, R., Sankarasubramanian, A., Lall, U.,
de Souza Filho, F.d.A., 2007. Climate, stream flow prediction
and water management in northeast Brazil: societal trends
and forecast value. Climatic Change 84, 217–239.
Bryant, R.L., 1998. Power, knowledge and political ecology in the
third world: a review. Progress in Physical Geography 22, 79–
94.
Chang, F.J., Chen, L., Chang, L.C., 2005. Optimizing the reservoir
operating rule curves by genetic algorithms. Hydrological
Processes 19, 2277–2289.
Coello, C.A.C., Lamont, G.B., Van Veldhuisen, D.A., 2007.
Evolutionary Algorithms for Solving Multi-objective
Problems. Springer Science + Business Media, LLC.
COGERH, 2011. A Experieˆncia da Alocac¸a˜o Negociada de A´gua no
Vale do Jaguaribe, 2 Oficina de Trabalho–Assisteˆncia
Te´cnica: Planejamento de Recursos Hı´dricos e Adaptac¸a˜o a
Variabilidade e Mudanc¸as Clima´ticas em Bacias
Hidrogra´ficas selecionadas no Nordeste, NATAL–24 a 26/
Agosto/2011. Companhia de Gesta˜o Dos Recursos Hı´dricos.
Cohon, J.L., 1978. Multiobjective programming and planning.
Academic Press, New York.
Connell, J.H., 1979. Intermediate-disturbance hypothesis.
Science 204, 1345.
Gao, Y.X., Vogel, R.M., Kroll, C.N., Poff, N.L., Olden, J.D., 2009.
Development of representative indicators of hydrologic
alteration. Journal of Hydrology 374, 136–147.
Gettys, C.F., Fisher, S.D., 1979. Hypothesis plausibility and
hypothesis generation. Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance 24, 93–110.
GWP, 2003. Poverty Reduction and IWRM. In: Committee, T.
(Ed.), TEC Background Papers, No. 8. Elanders Novum,
Sweden.
Haimes, Y.Y., Hall, W.A., 1974. Multiobjectives in water-
resource systems-analysis – surrogate worth trade off
method. Water Resources Research 10, 615–624.
Hardy, T.B., 1995. Assessing environmental-effects of severe
sustained drought. Water Resources Bulletin 31,
867–875.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 3 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 7 2 – 8 6 85Hogarth, R.M., 1981. Beyond discrete biases – functional and
dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics.
Psychological Bulletin 90, 197–217.
Hurford, A.P., Huskova, I., Matrosov, E.S., Harou, J.J., 2012. In:
Seppelt, R., Voinov, A.A., Lange, S., Bankam, D. (Eds.),
Impacts of management options on water deficits, losses
and livelihoods in the Jaguaribe Basin of North East Brazil.
International Congress on Environmental Modelling and
Software, Managing Resources of a Limited Planet: Pathways
and Visions under Uncertainty, Sixth Biennial Meeting.
International Environmental Modelling and Software Society
(iEMSs), Leipzig, Germany.
Johnsson, R.M.F., Kemper, K.E., 2005. Institutional and policy
analysis of river basin management: the Jaguaribe basin,
ceara, Brazil, Report no. WPS3649. The World Bank, New
York, USA.
Kallis, G., Videira, N., Antunes, P., Pereira, A.G., Spash, C.L.,
Coccossis, H., Quintana, S.C., Del Moral, L., Hatzilacou, D.,
Lobo, G., Mexa, A., Paneque, P., Matcos, B.P., Santos, R., 2006.
Participatory methods for water resources planning.
Environment and Planning C – Government and Policy 24,
215–234.
Kasprzyk, J.R., Reed, P.M., Kirsch, B.R., Characklis, G.W., 2009.
Managing population and drought risks using many-
objective water portfolio planning under uncertainty. Water
Resources Research 45.
Keim, D., Andrienko, G., Fekete, J.D., Gorg, C., Kohlhammer, J.,
Melancon, G., 2008. Visual analytics: Definition, process, and
challenges. In: Kerren, A., Stasko, J.T., Fekete, J.D., North, C.
(Eds.), Information Visualization: Human-Centered Issues
and Perspectives, LNCS 4950. Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg, pp. 154–175.
Kollat, J.B., Reed, P., 2007. A framework for visually interactive
decision-making and design using evolutionary multi-
objective optimization (VI(D)under-barEO). Environmental
Modelling & Software 22, 1691–1704.
Kollat, J.B., Reed, P.M., 2006. Comparing state-of-the-art
evolutionary multi-objective algorithms for long-term
groundwater monitoring design. Advances in Water
Resources 29, 792–807.
Kollat, J.B., Reed, P.M., Maxwell, R.M., 2011. Many-objective
groundwater monitoring network design using bias-aware
ensemble Kalman filtering, evolutionary optimization, and
visual analytics. Water Resources Research 47.
Liebman, J.C., 1976. Some simple-minded observations on role
of optimization in public systems decision-making.
Interfaces 6, 102–108.
Lotov, A.V., 2007. Visualization of pareto frontier in
environmental decision making. Environmental Security in
Harbors and Coastal Areas: Management Using Comparative
Risk Assessment and Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, pp.
275–292., http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5802-8_19
Loucks, D.P., 2006. Modeling and managing the interactions
between hydrology, ecology and economics. Journal of
Hydrology 328, 408–416.
Loucks, D.P., Van Beek, E., Stedinger, J.R., Dijkman, J.P.M.,
Villars, M.T., 2005. Water Resources Systems Planning and
Management: An Introduction to Methods, Models and
Applications. UNESCO.
Lund, J.R., 2012. Provoking More Productive Discussion of
Wicked Problems. Journal of Water Resources Planning and
Management – ASCE 138, 193–195.
Lund, J.R., Guzman, J., 1999. Derived operating rules for
reservoirs in series or in parallel. Journal of Water Resources
Planning and Management – ASCE 125, 143–153.
Marins, R.V., Lacerda, L.D., 2007. Summary of Drivers, Pressures
and Environmental Impacts in the Jaguaribe River Estuary,
NE Brazil, http://www.institutomilenioestuarios.com.br/
boletim_estuarios.html (Accessed 5th Feb 2013)Matrosov, E.S., Harou, J.J., Loucks, D.P., 2011. A computationally
efficient open-source water resource system simulator –
application to London and the Thames Basin. Environmental
Modelling & Software 26, 1599–1610.
Matrosov, E.S., Huskova, I., Kasprzyk, J.R., Harou, J.J., Reed, P.M.,
Subject to minor revisions. Many-Objective Optimization
and Visual Analytics Reveal Key Planning Trade-offs for
London’s Water Supply, Journal of Hydrology.
McCully, P., 2001. Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of
Large Dams. Zed Books Ltd., London.
Nash, J.E., Sutcliffe, J.V., 1970. River flow forecasting through
conceptual models. Part I – a discussion of principles. Journal
of Hydrology 10, 282–290.
Nguyen-Khoa, S., Smith, L.E.D., 2004. Irrigation and fisheries:
irreconcilable conflicts or potential synergies? Irrigation and
Drainage 53, 415–427.
Poff, N.L., Allan, J.D., Palmer, M.A., Hart, D.D., Richter, B.D.,
Arthington, A.H., Rogers, K.H., Meyers, J.L., Stanford, J.A.,
2003. River flows and water wars: emerging science for
environmental decision making. Frontiers in Ecology and the
Environment 1, 298–306.
Reed, P.M., Hadka, D., Herman, J.D., Kasprzyk, J.R., Kollat, J.B.,
2013. Evolutionary multiobjective optimization in water
resources: the past, present, and future. Advances in Water
Resources 51, 438–456.
Reed, P.M., Kasprzyk, J., 2009. Water resources management: the
myth, the wicked, and the future. Journal of Water
Resources Planning and Management – ASCE 135,
411–413.
Reed, P.M., Kollat, J.B., 2012. Save now, pay later? Multi-period
many-objective groundwater monitoring design given
systematic model errors and uncertainty. Advances in
Water Resources 35, 55–68.
Rittel, H.W.J., Webber, M.M., 1973. Dilemmas in a general theory
of planning. Policy Sciences 4, 155–169.
Roncoli, C., Kirshen, P., Etkin, D., Sanon, M., Some, L., Dembele,
Y., Sanfo, B.J., Zoungrana, J., Hoogenboom, G., 2009. From
management to negotiation: technical and institutional
innovations for integrated water resource management in
the Upper Comoe River Basin, Burkina Faso. Environmental
Management 44, 695–711.
Ryu, J.H., Palmer, R.N., Jeong, S., Lee, J.H., Kim, Y.O., 2009.
Sustainable water resources management in a conflict
resolution framework. Journal of the American Water
Resources Association 45, 485–499.
Reˆgo, T.C.C.C., 2001. Avaliac¸a˜o da perda d’a´gua em traˆ nsito na
bacia do rio Jaguaribe (in Portuguese), Department of
Hydraulic and Environmental Engineering. Universidade
Federal do Ceara´, Fortaleza, Brazil.
Sankarasubramanian, A., Lall, U., Souza, F.A., Sharma, A., 2009.
Improved water allocation utilizing probabilistic climate
forecasts: short-term water contracts in a risk management
framework. Water Resources Research 45.
Savage, L.J., 1954. The Foundation of Statistics. Dover
Publications.
Shiau, J.T., 2009. Optimization of reservoir hedging rules using
multiobjective genetic algorithm. Journal of Water Resources
Planning and Management – ASCE 135, 355–363.
Shukla, P.K., Deb, K., Tiwari, S., 2005. Comparing classical
generating methods with an evolutionary multi-objective
optimization method. Evolutionary Multi-Criterion
Optimization 3410, 311–325.
Suen, J.P., Eheart, J.W., 2006. Reservoir management to balance
ecosystem and human needs: incorporating the paradigm of
the ecological flow regime. Water Resources Research 42.
Taddei, R., 2011. Watered-down democratization:
modernization versus social participation in water
management in Northeast Brazil. Agriculture and Human
Values 28, 109–121.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 3 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 7 2 – 8 686Taddei, R.R., 2005. Of Clouds and Streams, Prophets and Profits:
The Political Semiotics of Climate and Water in the Brazilian
Northeast. Colombia University, USA.
Uphoff, N., Wijayaratna, C.M., 2000. Demonstrated benefits
from social capital: the productivity of farmer
organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka. World Development
28, 1875–1890.
van Oel, P.R., Krol, M.S., Hoekstra, A.Y., de Araujo, J.C., 2008.
The impact of upstream water abstractions on reservoir
yield: the case of the Oros Reservoir in Brazil. Hydrological
Sciences Journal – Journal Des Sciences Hydrologiques 53,
857–867.
WCD, 2000. Dams and Development: A New Framework for
Decision-Making: Report of the World Commission on Dams.
Earthscan Publications, London.
Yeh, W.W.G., 1985. Reservoir management and operations
models – a state-of-the-art review. Water Resources
Research 21, 1797–1818.Anthony Hurford is a PhD candidate at University College London
(UCL), co-sponsored by the UK EPSRC and HR Wallingford where
he works as a water management scientist. He has a BSc(Hons) in
environmental science and an MSc in hydrology from Imperial
College London.
Ivana Huskova is a doctoral student in water resources planning
and management at UCL. She is co-sponsored by the UK EPSRC
and Thames Water Utilities Limited.
Julien Harou has a PhD from the University of California at Davis in
water resources management and economics and an MEng from
Cornell University in environmental systems engineering. Recent-
ly he has worked with DEFRA, the European Commission, UK
water regulators, utilities, the World Bank, IUCN, and WWF. Dur-
ing this study he was a lecturer at UCL. From November 2013 he is
Professor of Water Management, Water Engineering Chair at the
University of Manchester and Honorary Professor at UCL.
